Within the immense amount of literature on the war, Dr. Jacob Ruchti's work "Zur Geschichte des Kriegsausbruches nach den amtlichen Akten der königlich großbritannischen Regierung"[1] (On the History of the Outbreak of War According to the Official Records of the Royal British Government), which was awarded a prize by the historical seminar of the University of Bern, may be given a very special value. For it contains an observation that is made according to the strict rules of historical research and the scientific conscientiousness that the historian seeks when wanting to form a judgment about factual contexts. What is usually attempted in the scientific world only long after the course of the events in question, Ruchti now undertakes for the events of the immediate present. After examining his work, it must be said that a favorable judgment of its content, an appreciation of its results, need not be the consequence of the standpoint one takes toward the causes of war according to one's ethnicity or similar causes, but that such an appreciation can be arrived at by the author's factually satisfactory scientific method by those who are amenable to gaining their convictions in a scientific manner.
Now many people are of the opinion that a discussion of the causes of war has already become a fruitless endeavor. But such a view cannot be maintained in the face of the way in which the statesmen and the press of the Entente are trying to impress upon the world the opinion that they are compelled to continue the war in spite of the peace offer of the Central Powers. Among the reasons they give, the one that the beginning of the war proves how a peaceful coexistence with the Central Powers can only be achieved by a crushing blow of the Entente against these powers plays a very special role. Now Ruchti shows that this assertion is based on an untrue legend, which was made up by the Entente against the statements of its own documents, in order to teach the world the view what it considers good to teach it about the outcome and goal of the war. Certainly, what Ruchti has put forward as a result has already been said many times and in the most diverse forms. But the significance of his writing lies, first, in his scientific treatment of the facts and, second, in the fact that a member of a neutral state communicates his results without reserve, and that a scientific seminar of this state finds the writing to be so in accordance with the scientific requirements that it crowns it with a prize. Ruchti also remains in the style of a scientific researcher, who nowhere goes beyond what the sources reveal, in the manner of such a researcher, he points out at the appropriate places exactly where the factual material becomes uncertain and where an objective judgment must be held back. He relies almost exclusively on English documents and uses the other states only to supplement this or that factual representation. And he arrives by this method at a result which may be summarized in the following words. The assertions by which the statesmen of the Entente want to persuade the world are recognized by the English documents as the opposite of the truth. The whole fabric of assertions made by Grey[2] and comrades about the peace efforts of the Entente statesmen disintegrates before Ruchti's scientific analysis and becomes one which shows only the appearance of peace efforts, but which in reality was not only certain to lead to war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany and Austria on the other, but was also likely to place England on the side of the aforementioned powers. From these explanations it is clear how Sasonov[3] makes the dispute between Austria and Serbia the starting point of a European conflict, and how Grey from the outset makes this Russian starting point his own and from it sets up his so-called peace efforts. There is not the slightest evidence that it ever occurred to Grey to arrange his diplomatic steps in such a way that Russia would have been forced to let Austria fight out its dispute with Serbia alone. Since Austria had given its assurance that it intended to achieve nothing by her warlike measures against Serbia but the complete acceptance of her ultimatum, and since this demanded nothing but an appropriate conduct on the part of Serbia towards the Austrian state within its present limits, there would have been no reason for war on the part of any other power if Grey had dissuaded Russia from interfering in the Austro-Serbian dispute. As a result, however, England was from the outset the ally of Russia and the opponent of the Central Powers, and Grey had initiated a policy which must necessarily have led to the war in the form in which it then came about. In contrast to what Grey did, the assertion that he did not succeed in maintaining peace only because Germany did not want it, turns out to be a reprehensible falsehood precisely because it is as likely as not to mislead the world by emphasizing a truth that is quite self-evident but also quite meaningless. For it is certainly clear that England, and probably also France and even Russia, would have preferred peace to war if it had been possible without it by diplomatic means to reduce Germany and Austria to political insignificance vis-à-vis the Entente and to make them submit to the Entente's will to power. It is not a question of whether Grey wanted peace or war, but of how he stood in relation to the claims of those powers at the outbreak of the war which were England's allies in the war. And Ruchti proves that Grey placed himself in such a way that by his behavior the war had to be necessarily brought about. One may certainly add to Ruchti's evidence that Grey himself did not want to push for war, but that he is a weakling who was pushed to his steps by others. But this does not change the historical assessment of his deeds. Ruchti succeeds completely in proving that Grey's diplomatic steps do not give him the slightest claim to claim that he did something to prevent the war. But the Swiss historian also succeeds in showing that the English statesmen behaved in the negotiations with Germany in such a way that they had been offered a reason for war by breaking neutrality with Belgium, which they could have avoided if they had accepted certain offers made by Germany. But they needed this reason for war in order to make it acceptable to their people, who could not have been brought to war because of Serbia and Russia's European claims. And for the persuasion of the people a forgery was also necessary, which Ruchti proves in the English White Paper. By falsifying dates in an exchange of letters that Grey had conducted, the English people were to be shown how peace-loving France had been invaded by Germany. By falsifying dates, the impression was created that Germany had attacked France much earlier than was really the case. In addition, in his war speech of August 6, 1914, Asquith, with the same success in deceiving the people, simply concealed decisive negotiations with Germany.
By objectively weighing all
these facts, Ruchti forms a judgment that entitles him to portray the so-called
peace effort of the English statesmen as an untrue legend and even to point out
the forces driving them to war. At the end he utters the grave words:
"History cannot be falsified in the long run, the legend cannot stand up
to scientific research, the dark fabric will be brought to light and torn, no
matter how artfully and finely it was spun." But for the time being the Entente still
seeks in this dark tissue one of the means to foist its dark craft of war on
the world as a necessity for the sake of civilization and of noblest humanity
[1] This book review by Rudolf Steiner under the original
title “Eine preisgekrönte wissenschaftliche Arbeit über die Geschchte des
Kriegsausbruches”appeared anonymously on April 17, 1917 in a German newspaper
in Mannheim. Taken fom „Aufsätze über die Driegliedrung des sozialen
Organismus“ (Dornach, 1961). First translation in English.
[2] Sir Edward Grey 1862-1933;
1905-1927 British minister of External Affairs
[3] Sergei Dimitrejewitsch, 1860-1927;
1910-1916 Russian minister of External Affairs
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